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Eliminating Claims that Jeopardize the Stature of
America's Capital Markets
Jeffrey W. Apel*
"Unless we improve our corporate climate, we risk allowing New
York to lose its pre-eminence in the global financial-services sector.
This would be devastating both for our city and nation .... [One
prominent factor driving this trend is that] [t]he U.K. and other na-
tions have laws that far more effectively discourage frivolous suits."'
I. INTRODUCTION
New York is in serious jeopardy of losing its identity as the financial
capital of the world, with London set to take its place. A number of
factors presently contribute to New York's waning financial domi-
nance. One of the most prominent factors driving this trend is the
increasing cost of defending meritless securities suits inuring to com-
panies listed on American stock exchanges.2 Despite Congress' re-
peated attempts to deter such suits through renewed securities
litigation statutes, the problem persists and threatens the stability of
New York's financial markets. The Second Circuit compounded the
already serious problem in 2005 by demonstrating that even those
plaintiffs that present the most frivolous of securities claims can some-
times be given standing when a creative plaintiff's lawyer is able to
exploit the ambiguous language of the relevant securities statutes. 3
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") pro-
vides that class action claims alleging fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale" of securities cannot be pursued in state court or
under state law; such claims are preempted by federal law and re-
moved to federal court.4 The vague "in connection with the purchase
or sale" language provides the plaintiff's lawyer with the means for
exploitation since the phrase "in connection with" is not expressly de-
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 2007; Bachelor of Chemical Engineering, Univer-
sity of Minnesota, 2003.
1. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn From London,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18.
2. Id. Other factors listed include the globalization of the capital markets, overregulation, and
incompatible accounting standards.
3. See Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2007).
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fined within the statute itself. Capitalizing on the federal preemption
provision's definitional ambiguity, the Second Circuit, in Dabit v. Mer-
rill Lynch, imported an additional twist into that statute's application
that would allow certain plaintiff classes to avoid the statute's preemp-
tive mandate. The Second Circuit held that a plaintiff class could es-
cape federal preemption of their claims by tailoring the class to
include only those plaintiffs that merely held their securities in re-
sponse to the alleged fraud.5 Accordingly, only those plaintiffs that
actually bought or sold securities in response to the alleged fraud
would see their claims federally preempted. 6 This differentiation will
be explained in greater detail later in this article.
Creating such an exemption to SLUSA's preemptive scope has far-
reaching implications. First, allowing such "holding claims" to escape
federal preemption allows a class of plaintiffs to try to take advantage
of less-stringent state securities laws, which is the reason that SLUSA
was enacted in the first place. Second, the absence of any purchase or
sale of the plaintiff's security renders any calculation of damages in-
herently suspect because these holding claims must be calculated by
relying solely on the unreliable words of the plaintiff. Third, creating
loopholes in SLUSA sends a signal to corporate executives that
America's legal system is unpredictable and risky, further jeopardizing
New York's position as the financial capital of the world.
The Seventh Circuit, observing Supreme Court precedent and rec-
ognizing the inherent danger of allowing such holding claims to escape
federal preemption, rejected the view later accepted by the Second
Circuit. 7 The Supreme Court reviewed the circuit split in 2006 and
properly rejected the Second Circuit's holding claim exemption to
SLUSA's preemptive scope.8 In doing so, the Court dismissed the
idea that such class-tailoring can be used to evade the more rigid fed-
eral securities law requirements imposed on plaintiffs under the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act 9 ("PSLRA").o
Apart from the Court's statutory interpretation, its decision is sup-
ported by three important legal justifications. First, the Court's inter-
pretation of the "in connection with" language of SLUSA gives effect
to the policy considerations behind Congress' enactment of the stat-
ute." Second, the damage arising out of a plaintiff's holding claim is
5. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 47.
6. Id.
7. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005).
8. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1507 (2006).
9. Pub.L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
10. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1507.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
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an economic fallacy: such claims do not result in any damages-in-
fact.12 Third, holding claims represent the most dangerous and least
meritorious theories of securities claims, which Congress has repeat-
edly tried to subvert through federal legislation.13
Most importantly, the Supreme Court's holding helps stabilize
America's capital markets by reducing meritless securities suits that
would otherwise add to the complexity and inherent legal risk for
companies listed on American stock exchanges. 14 Such an effect is
especially important today as America's stature as the financial capital
of the world is in jeopardy, with recent evidence demonstrating that
London is now overtaking New York as the world's preeminent city
for the financial services industry.15 In sum, the Supreme Court's de-
cision undermines this negative trend, thereby reinforcing New York's
position as the financial capital of the world.
This Comment dissects the Supreme Court's decision to reject hold-
ing claims as a means of evading federal preemption into four parts.
Part I analyzes the specific federal securities statutes that provide the
background for the Court's decision. Part II introduces the Second
and Seventh Circuit opinions, as well as the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of the circuit split. Part III explores why the Court's reasoning is
in line with precedent and essential to a proper textual reading of
SLUSA. Last, Part IV argues that the Supreme Court's decision
strengthens America's capital markets, thus helping New York retain
its position as the financial capital of the world.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
Prior to the 1930s, securities litigation was regulated by the individ-
ual states, effectively creating a system that allowed securities promot-
ers to engage in the outrageous conduct that contributed to the
economic downturn of the late 1920s.16 It was not until the 1929 stock
market crash and the advent of the New Deal that Congress inter-
vened by enacting two landmark statutes: the Securities Act of 193317
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part IV.D.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 1.
16. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 1.2[2] (4th ed. 2002).
17. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2007)). The 1933 Act is primarily concerned with full disclosure before the initial issuance of
securities to the buyer.
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("The 1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 193418 ("The
1934 Act"). This Article focuses principally on the impact of The 1934
Act since the statutory basis for rejecting holding claims is found
within the later Act.
B. The 1934 Act
The 1934 Act, while providing the statutory basis for plaintiffs to
pursue a private cause of action premised on a holding claim theory,
also serves as the statutory basis for justifying the rejection of these
same claims. Congress passed the 1934 legislation "[t]o provide for the
regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and
markets, and for other purposes." 19 The purpose of the legislation
was two-fold. First, the 1934 Act was designed in part to supplement
the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act by compelling publicly
held corporations to disclose information about their corporate affairs
in a manner substantially comparable to that required of issuers under
the 1933 Act.20 The second purpose of the 1934 Act was to regulate
broker-dealers and the markets for post-distribution purchases and
sales of securities. 21 Thus, the 1934 Act broadened its scope to regu-
late the entire marketplace rather than just purchasers and sellers of
securities. Most importantly, it is Section 10(b), and the analogous
Rule 10b-5, that provides the statutory basis for both the right to pur-
sue, and the subsequent rejection of, a cause of action premised on a
theory of "holding" damages.
C. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
While the securities acts set forth numerous anti-fraud provisions,
the most relevant provision to holding claims is Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, later promulgated as Rule 10b-5 by the SEC in 1948.22 Rule
10b-5 makes it unlawful:
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78mm (2007)).
19. Id.
20. 1-1 Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, MB § 1.01 (2007).
21. Id.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.23
Rule 10b-5 is a broad catch-all provision that serves as a key compo-
nent in the federal regulation of corporations. 24 The rule now over-
shadows any other express or implied right of action, becoming the
principal foundation for civil litigation under The 1934 Act.25 While
this rule concerns itself with securities fraud, it does not cover all types
of fraud - only that which occurs "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of securities.2 6
In order to prevail on a Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made a false representa-
tion or omission of a material fact, (2) the defendant acted with scien-
ter, (3) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant's
misrepresentation, (4) the misrepresentation or omission occurred "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities, and (5) that the
defendant's actions proximately caused the plaintiff's damages.2 7 The
"in connection with" requirement serves as the essential nexus be-
tween the fraud and the securities transaction. As evidenced in the
forthcoming discussion of Dabit, it is the single most scrutinized ele-
ment in interpreting the statute (and rule). Moreover, if the claim is
not brought in federal court, but rather in state court and under state
law, these more stringent requirements of proof may not apply since a
cause of action premised on state securities law may not carry with it
the same burden of proof standard found under federal securities law.
This is why federal preemption becomes so important to the ultimate
success of the claim. Because the "in connection with" requirement is
the only disputed issue in Dabit, this background section will not fur-
ther develop the other four requirements of a Section 10(b) claim.
23. Id.
24. CHARLES O'KELLEY & ROBERT THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS As-
SOCIATIONS 872 (4th ed. 2003).
25. 1-5 Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, MB § 5.04 (2007).
26. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 872.
27. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1999).
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1. The "In Connection With" Requirement
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and similarly Rule 10b-5, require that
the alleged fraud occur "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities.2 8 While the wording is indeed broad in scope, the language
itself actually limits which plaintiffs have standing to bring private suit
under the Act. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., the Second Cir-
cuit held that Rule 10b-5 extended protection only to the defrauded
purchaser or seller of securities, thus denying relief to claimants pur-
suing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or corporate mismanage-
ment. 29 Relying on the fact that Section 16(b) of The 1934 Act 30 gave
an express remedy for issuers and shareholders against corporate in-
siders misusing their position while neither Section 10(b) nor Rule
10b-5 granted such an express remedy, the court refused to allow the
shareholders' claims to proceed under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. 31
Accordingly, the court limited the availability of a private remedy
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to plaintiffs having already pur-
chased or sold the securities in question. 32
Twenty-three years later, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, the Supreme Court affirmed the rule established in Birnbaum
that the "in connection with" language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 limits the civil remedy solely to classes of purchasers and sellers. 33
To give every plaintiff the ability to proceed to trial (or settlement)
without some form of substantive limitation increases the potential for
abuse of the discovery system.34 Moreover, the Court noted the im-
portance of the limitation because, "[w]ithout the Birnbaum rule, an
action under Rule 10b-5 will turn largely on which oral version of a
series of occurrences the jury may decide to credit, and therefore no
matter how improbable the allegations of the plaintiff, the case will be
virtually impossible to dispose of prior to trial other than by settle-
ment. ' 35 Thus, while the rule undoubtedly excludes some legitimate
plaintiffs who allege violations of Rule 10b-5, the rule operates to give
standing to those plaintiffs whose version of the facts is more likely to
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
29. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that Congress did not seek to regulate trans-
actions which constitute no more than corporate mismanagement under §10(b)).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 869 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)).
31. Birnbaum, 193 F.3d at 464.
32. Id.
33. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
34. Id. at 741.
35. Id. at 742.
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be believed while separating out those plaintiffs who are less likely to
succeed.36 In sum, the "in connection with" language operates to ex-
clude those plaintiffs from bringing claims under §10(b) or Rule 10b-5
who have neither purchased nor sold securities in reliance on the de-
fendant's alleged misrepresentation or omission of fact.
D. A Private Right of Action Under Rule lOb-5
Congress' failure to expressly provide for a private right of action in
The 1934 Act resulted in a circuit split over whether a plaintiff class
may premise damages on a holding claim theory and survive federal
preemption. While the 1934 statute was a direct outgrowth of its 1933
predecessor, Congress did not include a private right of action in the
1934 statute: the private right is wholly implied from the statute by the
courts.37 Indeed, there was never any indication that Congress even
considered the possibility of private suits under the Act at the time of
its passage. 38 Congress initially enacted rule 10(b)-5 believing that the
SEC would enforce the statute through administrative and injunctive
actions. 39 Further, there is no indication that the SEC, in adopting the
rule, considered the question of private civil remedies under this
provision.40
Beginning with the seminal decision Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co. in 1946, the federal courts began to imply a private right of action
pursuant to rule 10b-5. 41 While this private right of action was not
expressly allowed under the statute, it was not expressly disallowed
either.42 The court thought it more important to imply the private
right of action, a result the court deemed to be in harmony with the
Act's general purpose: providing a remedy for persons injured by pro-
36. Id. at 743. In further explaining its rule, the court noted:
Obviously there is no general legal principle that courts in fashioning substantive law
should do so in a manner which makes it easier, rather than more difficult, for a defen-
dant to obtain a summary judgment. But in this type of litigation, where the mere exis-
tence of an unresolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff not only because of
the possibility that he may prevail on the merits, an entirely legitimate component of
settlement value, but because of the threat of extensive discovery and disruption of
normal business activities which may accompany a lawsuit which is groundless in any
event, but cannot be proved so before trial, such a factor is not to be totally dismissed.
Id. at 742-43.
37. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728-29.
38. Id. at 729.
39. Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994).
40. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
41. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
42. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
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scribed deceptive and manipulative acts.43 Thus, as Judge Easter-
brook notes, this private right of action under 10b-5 is a judicial
creation. 44 Accordingly, when the courts deal with these private rights
of action, they are dealing with "a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn. ' 45 Twenty-five years later the pri-
vate right principle introduced -in Kardon was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court.46 While this private right of action was created by the
courts, its legitimacy has since been endorsed by Congress. Congress
recognized that a private right of action is an indispensable tool for
investors that helps promote public and global confidence in capital
markets by deterring wrongdoing and ensuring proper job
performance. 47
E. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In 1995, Congress passed 48 the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("PSLRA"), 49 an extensive overhaul of the 1930s securities acts,
to provide uniform standards for class actions and other suits alleging
fraud in the securities market.50 The enactment of the PSLRA was a
direct response to plaintiffs who were abusing the private cause of
action, and Rule 10(b)-5 in particular, by bringing meritless class ac-
tion suits. 51 These meritless class actions - so called "strike suits" -
were brought with the simple goal of coercing large corporations into
exorbitant settlements.
Irked investors typically brought these claims following a substan-
tial drop in a company's stock price.52 The classic strike suit usually
involved the volatile stock of a high-growth tech-company that had a
record of outstanding performance but eventually missed Wall Street
expectations. 53 A securities class action lawyer then waited for the
moment the stock price plummeted to immediately file a complaint.54
The lawyer then named the company's officers, directors, accountants,
43. Id.
44. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2005).
45. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
46. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
47. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
48. Congress actually enacted the law over a presidential veto.
49. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
50. Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
51. Id. at 107.
52. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 18 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id.
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and consultants as defendants in the suit in the hopes of extracting
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.55
While it is logical to believe that these suits were filed because of
investor frustration, it was often the more troubling scenario of an
entrepreneurial trial lawyer using a "professional plaintiff" as a means
of "riding" into court.56 These plaintiffs were dubbed "professional
plaintiffs" for their propensity to be retained over and over by the
same law firms, garnering extra compensation for their participation,
while holding only a few shares of the defendant-company's stock.57
It is precisely this type of gamesmanship and manipulation that the
federal securities laws, specifically the PSLRA, aim to deter. The
overriding purpose of such laws is to protect investors and to maintain
confidence in the securities markets.58 However, the preexisting stat-
utes were not having the desired effect, as the House and Senate
Committees heard an alarming production of evidence confirming the
abusive practices of plaintiffs and lawyers: specifically, the practice of
routinely filing lawsuits against issuers of securities and other parties
whenever there was a significant change in the issuer's stock price,
wholly without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and
with only faint hope that the discovery process might eventually lead
to some plausible cause of action. 59 Naturally, these plaintiffs
targeted defendants with deep pockets, including accountants, under-
writers, and individuals who might be covered by insurance, without
regard to any actual wrongdoing. 60 These suits were successful largely
because the expense of defending against such claims forced defend-
ants to settle, regardless of the merits of the action. As a result, inno-
cent investors inevitably became the ultimate losers as the suits
undercut investor confidence in securities markets.61
Congress remedied these problems by instituting a number of new
procedural requirements for initiating a securities fraud claim in fed-
55. Id. at 15-16.
56. Id. at 16.
57. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 16.
58. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31.
59. Id.
60. Id. Further abuses include the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burden-
some that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle and the manipulation by class
action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent.
61. Id. at 32.
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eral court.62 The most significant requirements were the heightened
pleading standard and a mandatory stay of discovery.63
1. The PSLRA's Heightened Pleading Standard
Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, plaintiffs pleading securities
fraud under rule 10b-5 had to meet the pleading standard imposed by
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, "[i]n
all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred gener-
ally.' '64 However, the federal circuit courts were in disagreement
about how to apply this rule. Under the Second Circuit's approach,
plaintiffs were required to allege facts that gave rise to a strong infer-
ence of fraudulent intent.65 Regarded as being the most stringent
standard of any federal circuit, this standard served as the starting
point for the standard later adopted in the PSLRA.66 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, imposed an almost nonexistent standard, requiring only
that plaintiffs allege that scienter existed. 67
Relying on the apparent inability of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 9(b) to curb abusive lawsuits, Congress set about changing the
federal pleading requirements. 68 Consequently, pursuant to the
PSLRA, plaintiffs now have to meet two requirements in order to sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment. 69 First, plaintiffs who allege
that the defendant misrepresented or omitted a material fact are re-
quired to specify each statement alleged to have been misleading and
must set forth the reasons why that statement is misleading. 70 Fur-
ther, if the allegation is based on information and belief, the plaintiff
must state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. 71
Second, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts giving rise to a
62. See James A. Kassis, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 26 SETON HALL
LEoIS. J. 119 (2001). The most notable provisions of the Reform Act that intended to deal with
abusive and frivolous litigation are the safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements, the
heightened pleading standard, sanctions for frivolous filings, proportionate liability, appointing a
lead plaintiff, aiding and abetting liability, and a statute of limitation.
63. Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
65. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
66. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 ("The Conference Committee language is based in part on
the pleading standard of the Second Circuit.").
67. See In re Glenfed Ins. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994).
68. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2007).
70. § 78u-4(b)(1).
71. Id.
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strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. 72 Thus, Congress was able to follow through by establishing
more uniform and stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing
of meritless securities suits.73
2. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
Abusive litigation severely affects the willingness of corporate man-
agers to disclose information to the marketplace by instilling a sense
of fear that this information will later trigger the filing of class-action
securities claims.74 This lack of disclosure takes away some of the
most important information that existing and potential shareholders
use to evaluate the future outlook of the company.75 Recognizing this
chilling effect, Congress adopted a safe harbor provision to enhance
market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward-look-
ing statements.76 Accordingly, the provision grants protection to any
forward looking statement that is "accompanied by meaningful cau-
tionary statements identifying important factors that could cause ac-
tual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement. ' 77 For statements to lose their protection, the plaintiff
must prove that the statement was issued with actual knowledge that
it was false or misleading. 78
3. Mandatory Discovery Stay
Congress also incorporated a mandatory stay of discovery into pri-
vate securities actions79 in order to prevent unnecessary imposition of
discovery costs on the defendant.80 However, Congress also provided
an exception, whereby the mandatory stay will be excused if particu-
larized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent un-
due prejudice to that party.81
72. § 78u-4(b)(2).
73. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
74. Id. at 42-43.
75. Id. at 43.
76. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2007).
78. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i). "[I]f made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge by
that person that the statement was false or misleading; or (ii) if made by a business entity; was-
(I) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity; and (II) made or ap-
proved by such officer with actual knowledge by that officer that the statement was false or
misleading." Id.
79. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
80. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32.
81. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
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4. Other Important Provisions
The new rules also give another incentive to parties facing frivolous
law suits. The legislation contains a provision requiring the court to
include in the record specific findings of whether or not all parties and
all attorneys have complied with Rule 11(b)8 2 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 3 Further, if any party fails to satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 11(b), there is a presumption that the prevailing party
will be awarded its attorneys fees and costs for the entire action.84
Because the courts had previously failed to impose the Rule 11 sanc-
tions against parties bringing frivolous claims, this new procedure has
the effect of "giving teeth" to the rule.8 5
F. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, there were essentially no signifi-
cant securities class action suits brought in state court.8 6 However,
because the PSLRA made it more difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys to
bring a securities fraud claim in federal court, the PSLRA naturally
forced attorneys to file their claims in state court.87 Relying heavily
on a study published by Stanford law professor Michael Perino,88
Congress took notice of the shift of plaintiffs beginning to file their
securities suits in state court as opposed to federal court. To remedy
this unwanted consequence, Congress enacted the Securities Litiga-
tion Uniform Standards Act three years later which provides that:
(A) No covered class action based upon the statutory or common
law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any
State or Federal court by any private party alleging - (1) An untrue
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) That the defendant
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
(B) Any covered class action brought in any state court involving a
covered security, as set forth in [subsection (A)], shall be removable
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2007).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(3)(A) (2007).
85. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995).
86. See Michael Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 307-08 (1998).
87. See id. In general, Perino discusses the empirical study he co-authored with Joseph
Grundfest, demonstrating significant support for the inference that attorneys began to file their
claims in state court in response to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. In
particular, Perino reasons that attorneys are filing apparently weaker claims in state court to
avoid the Reform Act's heightened pleading standards, which in turn has the effect of undermin-
ing the policy initiatives of the Reform Act. Id. at 337.
88. See id.
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to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is
pending, and shall be subject to [subsection (A)]. 8 9
Consequently, class action securities fraud claims that arise in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities predicated upon state
law can no longer be advanced in state court, and more importantly,
claims arising out of federal law must be advanced in the federal court
system.90 This legislation therefore aimed to further the goals of the
PSLRA in protecting the interests of shareholders and employees of
public companies that are the target of meritless strike suits.91 Thus,
SLUSA has the intended consequence of closing the PSLRA loop-
hole, and accordingly, prevents plaintiffs from seeking to evade the
protections that federal law provides against abusive litigation by fil-
ing suit in state, rather than federal, court.92 It is readily apparent why
it is so important for defendants to be able to defend the litigation in
federal court and, in turn, why the application of SLUSA's preemp-
tion provision is so important.
However, Congress did exempt certain state actions alleging fraud
from the application of SLUSA. Specifically, SLUSA does not apply
to actions maintained in state or federal court by a private party under
the law of the state in which the issuer is incorporated or organized, 93
actions brought under the "Delaware carve-out," 94 derivative ac-
tions,95 actions brought by states and political subdivisions,96 and fi-
nally, actions under contractual agreements between issuers and
indenture trustees seeking to enforce provisions of the indenture. 97
III. THE PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW CLASS ACTION
HOLDING CLAIMS
A. Introduction
Congress' enactment of the PSLRA and SLUSA in the mid to late
1990s combined to target the perceived abuses of class action securi-
ties lawsuits, specifically those being brought in state court.98 More
specifically, in enacting SLUSA, Congress intended to make the fed-
89. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2007).
90. Id.
91. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
92. Id.
93. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(1)(A), 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i) (2007).
94. See §§ 77p(d)(1)(B), 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii).
95. See §§ 77p(f)(2)(B), 78bb(f)(5)(C).
96. See §§ 77p(d)(2), 78bb(f)(3)(B) (requiring that the plaintiffs be named and have authori-
zation to participate in the action).
97. See §§ 77p(d)(3), 78bb(f)(3(C).
98. See infra, Parts II.D-E.
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eral court the exclusive venue for class action securities suits "by man-
dating that such class actions be governed exclusively by federal
law." 99
Subsequently, plaintiffs became more creative: they attempted to
circumvent SLUSA's preemption provision by tailoring the plaintiff
class to "holders," rather than purchasers or sellers, of the securities.
Here, the idea was that because a class of "holders" neither purchased
nor sold the security, the "in connection with the purchase or sale"
language could not be met, thus SLUSA would not apply. And ac-
cordingly, they could pursue their securities claims in state court and
under state law. The following cases illustrate how the Second and
Seventh Circuits approached the issue and how the Supreme Court
subsequently decided that "holder" claims were preempted by
SLUSA.
B. The Second Circuit's Decision: Dabit v. Merrill Lynch
In January 2005, the Second Circuit issued a controversial decision
in Dabit v. Merrill Lynch,1° ° allowing class action suits to proceed
under state law if the plaintiff class was narrowly tailored to include
only those persons that held, but did not buy or sell, the securities in
response to a false or misleading statement. 10 1 In Dabit, plaintiff
Shadi Dabit brought a putative class action against Merrill Lynch in
Oklahoma District Court alleging that Merrill Lynch had issued bi-
ased research and investment recommendations designed to garner in-
vestment banking business. 10 2 More importantly, Dabit sought relief
under Oklahoma's state securities laws.10 3 The case was subsequently
removed to the Southern District of New York, at which point the
case was dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) 10 4 as preempted by SLUSA.10 5 The case was then appealed
to the Second Circuit.
Previously, in 2002, the New York Attorney General instituted a
formal investigation into Merrill Lynch's investment practices, sus-
pecting that the firm's loyalty to its investment banking clients re-
99. H.R. REP. No. 105-803.
100. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005). The opinion actually centers on two
separate appeals which were consolidated to present a single issue of first impression before the
court. The second appeal, involving IJG Investments, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
101. Id. at 44.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
105. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 28.
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suited in the firm issuing biased research and investment advice.10 6
This suit, among other private securities fraud actions, soon fol-
lowed.'0 7 Dabit, a former Merrill Lynch broker himself, claimed that
Merrill Lynch had overrated certain stocks in the process, resulting in
artificially inflated trading prices. 108 In turn, Dabit claimed that he
and other former Merrill Lynch brokers, who owned the affected
stocks, refrained from selling the recommended securities due to the
misleading research and advice. 10 9
Having heard Dabit's claim, the court was faced with deciding
whether the plaintiff's state law based holding claims were preempted
by SLUSA. 110 Immediately, the court noted that four conditions must
be satisfied to trigger SLUSA's removal and preemption provisions:
(1) the underlying suit must be a "covered class action;"'11 (2) the
action must be based on state or local law; (3) the action must concern
a "covered security;"" 2 and (4) the defendant must have misrepre-
sented or omitted a material fact or employed a manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance "in connection with the purchase or sale
of" that security.1t 3 It is clear from Dabit's allegations that the stocks
106. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1507 (2006).
107. Id.
108. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 29. Similar to the initial complaint, the amended complaint also as-
serts claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
109. Id. Dabit also claimed that he lost clients as a result of purchasing the recommended
stocks on behalf of his clients.
110. Id. at 27.
111. SLUSA defines a "covered class action" as:
(i) any single lawsuit in which -
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class
members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the
prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an al-
leged misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions affecting only
individual persons or members; or
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis
on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated, and ques-
tions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common
questions of law or fact, in which -
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and
(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action
for any purpose.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B) (2007).
112. SLUSA defines a "covered security" as "a security that satisfies the standards for a cov-
ered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, at
the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or de-
ceptive conduct occurred."
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(1)(5)(E) (2007).
113. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33.
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in question are "covered securities" and the lawsuit is a "covered class
action. ' 114 Accordingly, the central question on appeal became
whether the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were alleged to
be "in connection with the purchase or sale" of the covered
securities. " 15
Here, the "in connection with" language parallels what is found in
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which has been extensively analyzed in
that context by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court noted that
this language should have the same established meaning as it does in
the context of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.116 Moreover, the "in
connection with" language "must be read flexibly, not technically" to
effectuate its purpose.1 17 In setting up the crux of its holding, the
court noted that whether an alleged fraud arises "in connection with
the purchase or sale" of a security, such that it gives rise to a private
right of action for damages, the plaintiff's claims are initially subject to
a very important procedural limitation.11 8 That is, the rule of standing
(also known as the "purchaser-seller rule") affirmed in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores must be applied. 119 Again, the rule de-
veloped in Blue Chip Stamps operates to limit standing in a private
action under Rule 10b-5 to actual purchasers or sellers of the
security.1 20
The outcome of Dabit's claims then turned on the extent to which
the purchaser-seller rule limits the preemptive reach of SLUSA. Mer-
rill Lynch argued that the purchaser-seller rule is inapplicable to the
question of SLUSA's preemption power;121 Dabit argued that the rule
applies to limit the "in connection with" language of SLUSA, there-
fore rendering preemption inappropriate since the plaintiff class
neither purchased nor sold the securities in question, but only held
them.122 In the end, the court found Dabit's argument more persua-
sive than Merrill Lynch's policy-based argument. 123 The court rea-
soned that "[b]ecause only purchasers and sellers have a federal
private damages remedy, it is far more natural to suppose that Con-
114. Id. at 34.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 37. Accordingly, the cases generally give the "in connection with" language an
expansive construction. Id.
118. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 37.
119. Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Food Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
120. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754-55.
121. The Securities and Exchange Commission also supported this position in the amicus cu-
riae brief.
122. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 39.
123. Id.
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gress meant to import the settled standing rule along with the 'in con-
nection with' phrase as a substantive standard."'1 24
The court also felt that if they were to preempt these non-pur-
chaser/non-seller claims, they would be holding that the federal stat-
ute was completely preemptive of all state securities laws.125 Thus,
while "the legislative history includes some language that generally
indicates a broad preemptive intent," the -statute did not specifically
preempt these claims.126 In sum, the court held that SLUSA operated
only to ensure that private class actions brought by plaintiffs who sat-
isfy the purchaser-seller rule are subject to federal preemption.127 Ac-
cordingly, in the Second Circuit, plaintiffs bringing a class action
securities lawsuit could escape federal preemption by tailoring their
class to include only plaintiffs that held the securities in question,
without having actually purchased or sold the securities "in connec-
tion with" the defendant's alleged omission or misrepresentation.
128
C. The Seventh Circuit Decision: Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust
The Seventh Circuit, led by Judge Easterbrook in a decision prior to
Dabit, took the opposite stance on this preemption issue in Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust.129 In Kircher, plaintiff investors brought a class
action suit in Illinois state court, charging the mutual funds with set-
ting prices in a way that left the funds open to exploitation by arbi-
trageurs. 130 The funds then removed the suit to federal court and
sought dismissal under SLUSA; instead, the federal judges remanded
the suit.1 31 The decision was subsequently appealed.
The Seventh Circuit then had the task of deciding the same issue
that was presented to the Second Circuit in Dabit: whether a plaintiff
class composed of entirely non-purchasers and non-sellers could bring
a class action securities suit in state court under state law. 132 Plaintiffs
were all investors in mutual funds that were operated by defendant,
Putnam Funds Trust. The plaintiffs accused the defendant mutual
funds of acting recklessly in failing to prevent arbitrageurs from taking
124. Id. at 40.
125. Id. at 41.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 43.
128. It is also worth noting that Dabit failed to properly tailor his holding class strictly to non-
purchasers and non-sellers. Rather, his class contained plaintiffs that had purchased securities.
While his class failed to survive preemption, and was subsequently dismissed, it was done with-
out prejudice so that he could plead a claim sounding only in state law. Id. at 47.
129. 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
130. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 480 (2005).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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advantage of inter-market discrepancies in the price of stocks in their
funds. 133
The court, much like the Second Circuit, began by analyzing the
four conditions that must be satisfied to trigger SLUSA's preemption
provision: (1) the underlying suit must be a "covered class action"134;
(2) the action must be based on state or local law; (3) the action must
concern a "covered security" 135; and (4) the defendant must have mis-
represented or omitted a material fact or employed a manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance "in connection with the purchase or
sale of" that security. 136 Here, again, only the last prong - the "in
connection with" requirement - was contested by the parties. 137 Ac-
cordingly, as in Dabit, the outcome turned on whether or not the hold-
ing claims alleged an untrue statement or omission of a material fact
"in connection with" the purchase or sale of the security.
Where the analysis of the Second and Seventh circuits deviated was
how the purchaser-seller rule of Blue Chip Stamps applies to SLUSA.
In explaining the purpose of the purchaser-seller rule, the Seventh
Circuit first noted that the rule was developed
not because §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are limited to situations in which
the plaintiff itself traded securities, but because the private right of
action to enforce these provisions is a judicial creation and the
Court wanted to confine these actions to situations where litigation
is apt to do more good than harm. 138
133. As explained by Judge Easterbrook:
Mutual funds must set prices at which they sell and redeem their own shares once a day
... [e]ach defendant sets that price at 4 p.m. Eastern time, shortly after the New York
Stock Exchange closes .... When the funds hold assets that trade in competitive mar-
kets, they must value the assets at the market price .... For domestic securities, this
yields a current price; for securities of foreign issuers, however, it may produce a price
that is as much as 15 hours old.... If foreign stocks move predominantly up during this
interval (or if one foreign security moves substantially higher), the mutual fund as a
whole would carry a 4 p.m. price below what would be justified by the latest available
information, and an arbitrageur could purchase shares before 4 p.m. with a plan to sell
the next day at a profit. Likewise arbitrageurs could gain if the foreign stock falls after
close in its home market, and the arbitrageur knows that the U.S. mutual fund will be
overpriced at 4 p.m. relative to the price it is likely to have the next trading day when
new information from abroad finally is reflected in the fund's valuation.
Id. at 480-81 (citing Richard L. Levine, Yvonne Cristovici & Richard A. Jacobsen, Mutual Fund
Market Timing, Federal Lawyer 28 (Jan. 2005).
134. See supra note 111.
135. See supra note 112.
136. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482.
137. Id. at 481-82.
138. Id. at 483. Hence, anyone can say that the failure to trade was a consequence of the
defendant's actions, but judges and juries would have an exceedingly tough time knowing
whether the plaintiff's claim was in fact honest. Id.
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More importantly, Judge Easterbrook read the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Blue Chip Stamps as evincing a judicial intent to limit private
actions to claims borne out of actual trading on misrepresentations (or
omissions), while leaving the other securities offenses to public prose-
cutors - including holding claims such as plaintiff's. 139 As Judge Eas-
terbrook noted, the decisions that follow Blue Chip Stamps affirm the
fact that the purchaser-seller rule "deals with private actions alone
and does not restrict the coverage of the statute and regulation."'140
In the end, the Seventh Circuit held that class action holding claims
pursued in state court or under state law must be litigated as deriva-
tive claims or committed to public prosecutors.' 4 ' Additionally, the
court stated that the plaintiffs' effort to tailor their class to only those
who merely held the stock in response to the defendant's action was a
mere pretext towards evading the PSLRA. 142 The sole purpose of this
tailoring was to litigate their claim in state court in the hope of receiv-
ing an idiosyncratic award - the very situation that SLUSA was en-
acted to prevent.143
D. The Supreme Court's Ruling: Dabit Revisited
On September 27, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Second Circuit's decision in Dabit. Approximately six
months later, on March 21, 2006, the Supreme Court reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit, siding heavily with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
SLUSA's reach, as announced in Kircher.t 44 In doing so, the Supreme
Court held that the background, text, and purpose of SLUSA's pre-
emption provision all support the idea that state-law class-action hold-
ing claims are in fact preempted by SLUSA. 145
In deciding the proper relationship between the purchaser-seller
rule and the "in connection with" requirement as it relates to
SLUSA's preemption of these holding claims, the Court looked prin-
cipally at the policy considerations behind the rule and the statute.
First, the Court reiterated that the purchaser-seller rule is a judicially
crafted remedy. 146 In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court chose to limit the
139. Id.
140. Id. at 483-84 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Holmes v. SIPC, 503
U.S. 258 (1992); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979)).
141. Id. at 484.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1507 (2006).
145. Id. at 1507-14.
146. Id. at 1510. See also Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483. There the court noted that "Blue Chip
Stamps came out as it did not because §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are limited to situations in which
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private remedy under the auspices of "policy considerations;" similar
policy considerations were also the impetus for the enactment of the
PSLRA - abuse of the securities laws.147 Thus, the purchaser-seller
rule was not divined from the text of §10(b) or Rule 10b-5.148 Rather,
the Court in Blue Chip Stamps looked to define the scope of a private
right of action under Rule 10b-5, not to define the language of the
Rule.149
As the purchaser-seller rule itself was a product of policy considera-
tions, its application to SLUSA was a matter of policy consideration as
well. 150 Here, the Court noted that policy considerations favor a
broad construction of SLUSA, thereby encompassing holding claims
such as those brought by Dabit.' 51 More specifically, a narrow read-
ing of the statute would "undercut the effectiveness of the PSLRA
and thus run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose."'1 52 Moreover, past
Supreme Court decisions favored a broad interpretation of the statu-
tory language. 153 Specifically, the Court looked at its own previous
interpretations of the statute, which only required that the alleged
fraud "coincide" with the securities transaction. 154
Further, contrary to the claims of the Second Circuit, 55 reading the
preemptive arm of the statute to include class-action holding claims
does not result in the preemption of all state-law class-action claims
(i.e., complete preemption).156 Instead of viewing the statutory lan-
guage in the context of what claims are in fact preempted, 57 the Su-
the plaintiff itself traded securities, but because a private right of action to enforce these provi-
sions is a judicial creation and the Court wanted to confine these actions to situations where
litigation is apt to do more good than harm" (emphasis added). But see Dabit, 395 F.3d at 40, for
a differing view of the importance of the purchaser-seller rule being a judicial creation: "Nor are
we moved by the observation that the standing rule is merely a judge-made gloss on the statute
and the Rule ...."
147. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1510 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738).
148. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1512.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1514-15.
151. Id. at 1513. "The presumption that Congress envisioned a broad construction follows not
only from ordinary principles of statutory construction but also from the particular concerns that
culminated in SLUSA's enactment." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)).
155. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25, 41 (2d Cir. 2005).
156. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. 1514. ". . . SLUSA does not actually pre-empt and state cause
of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class action device to vindicate certain
claims. The Act does not deny any individual plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50
plaintiffs, the right to enforce any state-law cause of action that may exist." Id.
157. See Dabit, 395 F.3d at 41. The Second Circuit looked more at whether the statute explic-
itly included the preemption of holding claims, noting that "[t]he legislative history includes
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preme Court thought it more significant to analyze what claims the
statute excluded from preemption. Here the Court noted that the
statute excludes a number of state-based claims, thus demonstrating
that Congress was not "acting cavalierly" in preempting an overly-
broad range of state-law claims thereby approaching complete pre-
emption.158 Consequently, the Court stated that "[t]he existence of
these carve-outs both evinces congressional sensitivity to state prerog-
atives in this field and makes it inappropriate for courts to create addi-
tional, implied exceptions.' ' 159 Accordingly, the Court held that class-
action holding claims based upon state law fall within the ambit of
SLUSA's preemption provision.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. Introduction
In Dabit, the Supreme Court provided a detailed, comprehensive
analysis of why state-law class action holding claims are preempted by
SLUSA, and in turn, the policy concerns that support its decision. Ac-
cordingly, this section will not seek to revisit and further develop each
legal justification that the Court has already made. However, apart
from the beneficial impact the decision has on the financial commu-
nity, which will be addressed in the next section, it is worth outlining
further justifications as to why the Supreme Court made the correct
decision, while highlighting in greater specificity one of the principal
factors in the Court's holding. The three arguments outlined here that
reinforce the Court's holding are (1) The "in connection" with lan-
guage of Section 10(b) should be interpreted broadly to support the
policy behind the statute; (2) The supposed financial damage arising
out of a plaintiff's holding claim is an economic fallacy; and (3) Hold-
ing claims represent the most dangerous of securities claims.
some language that generally indicates a broad preemptive intent, but contains no specific men-
tion of holding claims or other non-purchaser/non-seller claims." Id.
158. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1514. ".... the tailored exceptions to SLUSA's preemptive
command demonstrate that Congress did not by any means act 'cavalierly' here. The statute
carefully exempts from its operation certain class actions based on the law of the State in which
the issuer of the covered security is incorporation, actions brought by a state agency or state
pension plan, actions under contracts between issuers and indenture trustees, and derivative
actions brought by shareholders on behalf of a corporation." Id.
159. Id.
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B. The "In Connection With" Language Should Be
Interpreted Broadly
The "in connection with" language of SLUSA must be interpreted
broadly to give effect to the intentions expressed by Congress. More
important than policy justifications alone is the principle of stare deci-
sis: the Supreme Court has consistently held that the "in connection
with" language is to be interpreted broadly. 160 Accordingly, based on
the Supreme Court's prior statutory construction, the Court was again
correct in deciding that plaintiffs' holding claims arose "in connection
with" Merrill Lynch's alleged misrepresentations.
Moreover, all of the circuit courts that have analyzed the statutory
language have similarly concluded that the meaning of "in connection
with" under SLUSA is coterminous with the meaning of the nearly
identical language in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.161 It then follows
that the "in connection with" language should be analyzed with re-
spect to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, it is this analysis that
became the "sticking point" since not all circuits agreed as to what
Rule 10b-5 itself means.1 62 Here, however, even the Second Circuit,
where Dabit's claim originated, had recognized that the language of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "must be read flexibly, not technically
and restrictively" so that "novel" and "atypical" as well as "garden
type variety" frauds do not escape its prohibitive scope. 163 Moreover,
Section 10(b) should be "construed not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.1 64
The Supreme Court has previously held that when the misrepresen-
tation "coincide[s] 1 165 with or is "touching"' 66 the sale of securities,
the "in connection with" language of Rule 10b-5 is satisfied. Accord-
ingly, the misrepresentation and the sale of securities "coincide" when
they are "not independent events."'1 67 Thus, Rule 10b-5 is violated
"whenever [false] assertions are made in a manner reasonably calcu-
lated to influence the investing public" in their decisions regarding the
160. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975); United
States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); SEC v. Zanford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
161. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482; Dabit, 395 F.3d at 28. See also Rowinski v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 506-97
(8th Cir. 2002); Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002); Riley v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2002).
162. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482.
163. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 37 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 11 (1971)).
164. Zanford, 535 U.S. at 819.
165. Id. at 825.
166. Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12-13.
167. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820.
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purchase or sale of securities. 68 These axioms do not just stand alone
in the dicta of the Court opinions. Rather, they are the rules the
Court has developed in analyzing the allegedly fraudulent transac-
tions. As these cases point out, the application of these rules is consis-
tent with a broad interpretation of the "in connection with" language
of §10(b).
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Hagan169 lends
further support to the position that the "in connection with" language
of SLUSA should be interpreted broadly. O'Hagan was a partner at a
major law firm which was representing a party considering a possible
tender offer for the Pillsbury Company's common stock. 170 Although
O'Hagan did no specific work on the representation, he began
purchasing stock in Pillsbury.171 When the tender offer was an-
nounced, O'Hagan had made a profit of roughly $4.3 million through
his illegal investment. 172 O'Hagan was then charged and convicted
with defrauding his law firm and its client by misappropriating for his
own trading purposes, material nonpublic information regarding the
tender offer.1 73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the
Eighth Circuit reversed all of O'Hagan's convictions. 174
In reversing the convictions and rejecting the misappropriation the-
ory in the context of Rule 10b-5, the Eighth Circuit held that "only a
breach of a duty to parties to the securities transaction or, at the most,
to other market participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give
rise to § 10(b) liability." 75 By analogy, one can see that this is the
same argument that the Second Circuit found compelling in Dabit.
However, the Supreme Court in O'Hagan disagreed with the Eighth
Circuit, ruling that "§10(b) refers to 'the purchase of sale of any secur-
ity,' not to identifiable purchasers or sellers of securities" (emphasis ad-
ded). 176 The language of the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan
laid the groundwork for the Court's later decision in Dabit.177
The Court further solidified its ruling in O'Hagan six year later in
SEC v. Zanford.t78 In Zanford, respondent was a broker who was
168. Brief of Amici Curiae United States, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 2005 WL 3048028, at *11
(quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2nd Cir. 1968)).
169. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
170. Id. at 647.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 648.
173. Id. at 649.
174. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
175. Id. at 644.
176. O'Hagan, 512 U.S. at 660.
177. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1513.
178. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
2007]
628 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
selling his customer's securities and using the proceeds for his own
benefit without the customer's knowledge or consent.179 The Su-
preme Court was again forced to decide whether the fraudulent con-
duct was "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 180
Yet again, the Supreme Court, while implementing a broad interpreta-
tion of the Section 10(b) language, held that the alleged conduct was
within the meaning of the rule.181 In its ruling, the Court placed em-
phasis on the fact that "the securities sales and respondent's fraudu-
lent practices were not independent events" (emphasis added). 182 It
was not the case where the fraudulent act occurred after the actual
securities transactions.183 Rather, the Court noted, "respondent's
fraud coincided with the sales themselves" (emphasis added). 184
Thus, the Supreme Court has long recognized that a Section 10(b)
violation is not predicated upon the fraud or deception of an identifi-
able purchaser or seller. 185 Rather, the misleading statement or omis-
sion must be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of any
security.186 Further, it is important to look to the temporal aspect of
the alleged fraud - whether the fraud "coincides" with the purchase or
sale of any security.187 Applying these rules to the case at hand, it is
readily apparent that the Supreme Court correctly followed its own
precedent in holding that class action holding claims fall within the
ambit of SLUSA's preemption provision since the Court's prior con-
struction of the "in connection with" language certainly encompasses
Dabit's claim.
C. The "Damage" Arising out of a Holding Claim is an
Economic Fallacy
In the absence of injury in-fact, a court should not grant a plaintiff
standing to pursue his claim, especially when that claim carries with it
such disproportionate discovery costs, thereby increasing the chances
of a meritless settlement. Plaintiff-investors that base their claims on
the premise that they suffered damages by holding their stock in reli-
ance upon a misrepresentation are incapable of proving real economic
179. SEC v. Zanford, 535 U.S. 813, 815 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 819.
182. Id. at 820.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1513.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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injury.188 Rather than cause the loss, the "misrepresentation merely
postpones the timing of the preexisting holders' recognition of a loss
from a business setback. ' 189 It is the earlier business setback that is
the actual cause of the loss.190
A thorough explanation of why class action holding claims have no
legitimate economic damages can be found in the Fifth Circuit case of
Crocker v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.:191
The flaw in the [holders'] argument is that it assumes a market for
the stock existed at an artificially high price. This inflated price, and
hence the particular market for the stock, was maintained only be-
cause of the wrongdoing of the [defendants], who concealed mate-
rial financial information from the shareholders and the public that
would have demonstrated the failing condition of the [company]. It
follows that, had this information been released, the stock price
would have immediately and precipitously fallen especially if, as is
implicit in the [holders'] theory, an entire class of shareholders had
simultaneously dumped their stock on the market. Thus, there
would have been no market for the stock at the artificially high
price. Without such a market, the [holders'] envisioned "profit op-
portunity" evaporates into hardly more than an illusion. 192
A holding class does not claim that they desired to sell their shares at
a particular point, but rather, they were deterred from selling at all
because of the misrepresentation. 193 The class then argues that had
they known of the misrepresentation, they would have sold their
shares at the artificially inflated price.194 Consequently, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that such a claim was too speculative to state an injury and
accordingly, "the alleged 'lost profit opportunity' was, in reality, no
profit opportunity at all." 195 This type of claim is far different from
the case of a purchaser or seller who actually decides to buy or sell
shares in reliance on information later shown to be false since the
price at which they decided to purchase or sell the securities was still
affected by the misrepresented information. Conversely, shares that
were merely held over the same period cannot produce a claim of
economic injury since the false information no longer affects the stock
188. Brief Amici Curiae of the Securities Industry Association and the Bond Market Associa-
tion in Support of Petitioner, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 2005 WL 3076091, at *17. ". . . prior to
SLUSA, every federal court to examine a holder class claim had concluded that, as a class,
holders cannot be injured by a misrepresentation or omission." Id.
189. Id. at *18.
190. Id.
191. 826 F.2d 347, 351-52 (1987).
192. Supra note 188, at *17.
193. Crocker v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 351 (1987).
194. Id.
195. Id.
2007] 629
630 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
price. 196 Accordingly, holding claims are not a plausible cause of ac-
tion since there is no actual injury to the plaintiff.
D. Holding Claims Represent the Most Dangerous of
Securities Claims
Holding claims are the type of vexatious securities claims that Con-
gress tried to subvert when it enacted SLUSA. Ironically, the policy
considerations that led the Court to create the purchaser-seller rule of
standing in Blue Chip Stamps also serve as the basis for preempting
state-law class action holding claims: a plaintiff who sues for damages,
yet having neither purchased nor sold securities, is basing the claims
upon a "largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which the
number of shares [and price] involved will depend on the plaintiff's
subjective hypothesis." 197
Speaking on the claims litigated in Blue Chip Stamps, Judge Easter-
brook noted, "anyone can say that a failure to trade bore some rela-
tion to what the issuer did (or didn't) disclose, but [ ] judges and juries
would have an exceedingly hard time knowing whether a given
counterfactual claim ("I would have traded, if only") was honest." 198
The same problem is presented within the issue of holding claims: the
outcome is largely determined on which oral version of a series of
occurrences the jury decides to credit. 199 The problem is further am-
plified because proof depends almost entirely on oral testimony, with
the elements to which the plaintiff will testify being completely un-
knowable to the defendants. 200 In sum, the dangers that arise out of a
plaintiff's holding claims are vexatious in nature and are the type of
claims that SLUSA intended to stop.
V. STABILIZING AMERICA'S CAPITAL MARKETS BY PREEMPTING
HOLDING CLAIMS
A. Introduction
In the most general sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Dabit
serves to further the directives set forth by Congress in its enactment
of the PSLRA and SLUSA. More specifically, the Court's decision
helps bolster the objectives expressed in the securities acts by helping
196. Id.
197. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35 (1975).
198. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483 (summarizing part of the Court's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps).
199. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 2005 WL 3067181, at *23 (citing Blue Chip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 742).
200. Id.
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the courts maintain a uniform standard for class action securities suits
while eliminating meritless securities claims. A uniform standard that
deters frivolous securities suits is essential in creating a more equita-
ble and predictable legal environment for corporations listed on
America's stock exchanges.
The Court's decision should also have a demonstrable impact on a
serious problem that is in the beginning stages of being addressed by
members of Congress: New York City's fading dominance as the fi-
nancial capital of the world.20 1
B. New York City's Waning Financial Dominance
London's mayor, David Brewer, recently opined to a gathering of
the world's most powerful bankers and business executives this past
summer that "[London is] the international finance and business capi-
tal of the world, the world's greatest global finance center, without
question. '20 2 Whether or not this statement by London's mayor
should be written off as stylish pandering to London's financial elite, a
growing number of politicians and financial commentators are raising
concerns about the possibility that New York is relinquishing its cen-
tury-long stronghold as the world's financial capital.203 Although the
issue did not become a serious point of discussion until this past sum-
mer, evidence of New York's waning dominance surfaced when it was
announced that 24 of the top 25 initial public offerings (IPO's) in 2005
were issued on exchanges outside of the United States.2°4
1. The Global Finance Trend
The importance of this recent relocation trend of the world's finan-
cial capital became readily apparent with the release of a study done
by McKinsey & Company, which was commissioned by New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles Schu-
mer ("the McKinsey Study"). 20 5 The McKinsey Study notes that, as of
201. See Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn From
London, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18.
202. Heather Timmons, New York Isn't the World's Undisputed Financial Capital, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2006.
203. Id.
204. Alan Murray, BUSINESS: Fees May Be Costing Wall Street Its Edge in Global IPO Mar-
ket, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2006, at A2.
205. McKinsey Study, Sustaining New York's and the US' Global Financial Services Leader-
ship, Commissioned by New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and New York Senator
Charles E. Schumer (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/Schumer
Website/pressroom/special-reportsi2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter McKinsey
Study].
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today, the United States financial markets, with New York as its
center, are still the world's largest and undoubtedly one of the most
important.2°6 And in terms of global financial stock,207 the United
States remains the largest market. 20 8 However, what is disconcerting
is the rate at which financial stock is growing in various markets
around the globe relative to that of the United States. While the fi-
nancial stock market in the United States is approximately 25% larger
than that of Europe, approximately 61% higher than that of Japan,
and approximately 75% larger than non-Japan Asia-Pacific, the
growth rate shows a rapidly shrinking gap.209 The United States is last
in growth during the period of 2001 to 2005: Non-Japan Asia-Pacific
experienced growth of 15.5%, Japan at 7.5%, Europe at 6.8% (includ-
ing the UK at 8.4%), and the United States with 6.5% growth.210
Small-cap companies are adding to this trend as well, with London's
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) becoming the dominant listing
venue.211 Since the beginning of 2001, AIM has listed more than twice
as many companies (484) as the NASDAQ (224).212 This marks a sig-
nificant shift in NASDAQ's historical dominance of listings as well as
volume.213
Moreover, the trend is not just limited to the stock markets alone.
The investment banking, sales, and trading revenues in Europe now
almost match that of the United States as well, with totals reaching
$109 Billion in the United States, $98 Billion in Europe, and $37 Bil-
lion in Asia. 21 4 However, broken down even further, the sales and
trading revenues in Europe in 2005 have now eclipsed those of the
United States. 215 A more pronounced trend is now occurring in the
international IPO market as well. Through the first ten months of
2006, the United States exchanges attracted barely one-third of the
share of IPO's measured by market value that they captured back in
206. Id. at 9.
207. Id. at n. 5 (defining "financial stock" as equities, private debt, government debt, and
bank deposits).
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at 9, Exhibit 1. As of 2005 the United States' financial stock is roughly $51 Billion,
Europe at $38 Billion, Japan at $20 Billion, and Non-Japan Asia-Pacific at $13 Billion. Id.
210. Id.
211. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 50.
212. Id.
213. In 2004, NASDAQ had raised more than four times the capital of which was raised on
London's AIM. However, during the first 10 months of 2006, the volume of new issuances of the
two exchanges was practically even: $11.9 Billon on the NASDAQ and $10.4 Billion on the AIM.
Id.
214. Id. at 11, Exhibit 2.
215. Id. Revenues from sales and trading have no reached $74 Billion in Europe, $69 Billion
in the United States, and $30 Billion in Asia. Id., Exhibit 2.
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2001.216 Over the same period, Europe saw its market share of IPO's
increase by 30% and Asian markets by 50%.217
The trend has also surfaced in the derivatives market. In a market
that is likely still in its infancy, Europe has cornered a 56% share of
the $52 Billion revenue pool from derivatives and a 60% share in the
market for interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and fund-linked de-
rivatives. 218 Conversely, the United States leads only in the commod-
ity derivatives market.219 Further, as European lenders begin to
embrace US-style credit terms, the United States' dominance in the
leveraged lending market is likely to see intense competition in the
near future as well. 220
2. The Impetus for the Drift Away from New York
There is an extensive list of factors believed to be driving the recent
geographical shift of financial dominance away from the United
States; yet no single factor is entirely responsible for the effect. Fortu-
nately, two lengthy studies released in the last year provide great in-
sight into this occurrence: the June 2006 study by Oxera Consulting
Ltd., commissioned by the City of London and the London Stock Ex-
change ("the Oxera Study") 221 and the January 2007 McKinsey
Study222 previously mentioned.
The Oxera Study gives one explanation why the recent trend in
IPO's favors Europe: the underwriting fees charged by investment
banks in the United States are roughly twice as high as those charged
in Europe. 223 Underwriting fees in the United States market typically
range from 6.5 to 7.0%, while fees in Europe are usually in the range
of 3 to 4%.224 One reason for the higher fees may be the difference in
underwriting techniques used. In the United States, a technique
called bookbuilding tends to be used for almost all IPO's, and fees for
216. Id. at 12.
217. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 12.
218. Id. at 13.
219. Id. at 12.
220. Id. at 13.
221. Oxera Consulting Ltd., The Cost of Capital: An International Comparison (June 2006),
available at http://www.londonstockexchange.con/NR/rdonlyres/B032122B-BIDA-4E4A-BIC8-
42D2FAE8EBO/O/Costofcapital-full.pdf. The study was commissioned to independently ana-
lyze the attractiveness of the London capital markets compared with other financial centers.
"The aim of the study is to assess the extent to which London provides an attractive venue for
raising capital via public equity and listed debt relative to other markets, and to evaluate the
implications for the cost to companies of raising capital in different markets." Id. at 7.
222. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 7.
223. Id. at 4.
224. Id.
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bookbuilding are typically higher than those for other techniques. 225
In the European underwriting market, a variety of cheaper techniques
are used, including fixed-price public offers, placings, and auctions. 226
And since underwriting fees constitute the single largest element of an
IPO, the underwriting price distortion among international competi-
tors fuels the financial capital relocation trend.227
The Oxera Study, however, focused primarily on the internal cost
structure of IPO's in relation to exchange listings across the globe.
Accordingly, the report was not meant to provide a quantitative com-
parison of the legal framework that governs each country's ex-
changes. 228 While the Oxera Study's points certainly need be raised
here, the study did not delve into the most important problem as it
relates to this Article - the disparity in costs arising out of meritless
securities suits that too often accompany a listing on America's stock
exchanges - an area that the lengthier McKinsey study addresses.
A centerpiece of the McKinsey Study was its investigation into the
attitudes of financial services leaders in the United States and over-
seas.229 The investigation identified three factors that clearly domi-
nate financial services leaders' views of New York as a place to do
business: skilled workers, 230 the legal environment, and regulatory
balance. 231 More specifically, the study noted that a fair and predict-
able legal environment was the most important criterion in determin-
ing a financial center's competitiveness that can be affected by
policymakers. 232 This criterion certainly favored doing business
outside of the United States, with financial leaders opining that the
225. Id. at 19.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 25.
228. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 30. As the reports acknowledges:
There are important differences in the regulatory frameworks of the countries that af-
fect both the primary and secondary equity markets. An in-depth discussion would
require considerable legal analysis and constitute a research study in itself .... [Thus,
the study] presents only a summary of those aspects that were raised most frequently in
interviews with companies as being relevant in the decision of where to float and raise
capital.
Id.
229. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 14.
230. This criterion weighed in favor of New York as a place to do business with the people
surveyed perceiving the talent pool in New York to be superior to that of London. Id. at 66.
231. The business leaders that were polled perceived the United Kingdom's "single, princi-
ples-based financial sector regulator - the Financial Services Authority (FSA) - as superior to a
less responsive, complex US system of multiple holding company and industry segment regula-
tors at the federal and state levels." Id. at 17.
232. Id. at 16. The talent of skilled workers was the top factor in determining a financial
center's competitiveness, however, this is not a factor that can be changed by the courts and the
legislature.
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United States market was at a disadvantage due to America's propen-
sity toward litigation and concerns that America's legal environment
is less fair and less predictable than London's legal environment. 233
The McKinsey Study further noted that settlements in securities
cases reached a record $3.5 billion in 2005, up more than 15% from
2004 and nearly 70% from 2003.234 Such figures seem to perpetuate
the popular belief that America has a much higher propensity towards
litigation: 85% of CEO's surveyed by McKinsey felt that the legal cost
of doing business in London was lower, while not a single CEO held
the equivalent belief about New York. 235 This perception is further
reinforced by the number of American companies forced into bank-
ruptcy in recent years.236 It is thus clear that despite Congress' enact-
ment of the PSLRA and SLUSA, securities litigation reform is still a
pressing issue.
C. The Beneficial Consequences of the Supreme Court and Dabit
The aim of the McKinsey Study, apart from analyzing the problems
facing America in its quest to continue its financial dominance, was to
provide policymakers with recommendations to make the United
States financial markets more competitive. 237 The research primarily
relied upon in the study strongly indicated that unless significant
changes are made to America's litigation system, financial services
businesses will likely favor less litigious jurisdictions abroad over the
benefits of cheaper capital in America.238 Among what the report
termed the "critically important priorities ' 239 is the need to imple-
ment securities litigation reform, which is the central reform discussed
in this article. 240
According to the study, the foundation of any reform should be to
"eliminate those suits filed to pressure companies into settlement
233. Id.
234. Id. at 74. The 2005 figure excludes WorldCom related settlements of approximately $6.2
Billion.
235. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 75. The remaining 20% did not choose a side. Ad-
ding to this perception may be the fact that Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes
personal liability on corporate executives for failing to comply with the Act.
236. Id. at 76.
237. Id. at i.
238. Id. at 101.
239. The three critically important near-term priorities were (1) Provide clearer guidance for
implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; (2) Implement securities litigation reform; and (3) De-
velop a shared vision for financial services and a set of supporting regulatory principles. Id. at
18.
240. Id.
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rather that to redress legitimate wrongs. ' 241 The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Dabit has this exact effect. As discussed previously in Sec-
tion IV B and C, the holder claims brought in Dabit are some of the
most dangerous securities claims. Moreover, holding claims are not a
valid economic claim and are thus not deserving of a settlement from
a corporation. Accordingly, the Dabit decision has the effect of
strengthening the integrity and efficiency of the market.242
Even weak securities cases, with little merit such as Dabit's, may
have substantial settlement value since "[t]he very pendency of the
lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity. '243 Naturally,
as meritless cases such as Dabit's are allowed to survive to the settle-
ment phase, settlement values increase, thus compounding the already
present problem of record securities settlements in domestic courts. 244
Consequently, the availability of such claims fuel the perception held
by CEO's that foreign exchanges have a lower legal cost of doing
business.
In ruling that holding claims are preempted by federal law, the
Court's holding helps quell the worries of business executives. As re-
ported by the McKinsey Study:
Relative to most other countries, the US legal system is multi-tiered
and highly complex. Not only is it divided between state and fed-
eral courts, but it also uses a variety of enforcement mechanisms,
including legal actions by regulators, state and federal attorneys
general, plaintiff classes, and individuals. As a result, and despite a
high level of proficiency in most courtrooms (especially at the fed-
eral level), the system's inherent complexity has the unfortunate
side effect of making it harder to manage legal risk in the US than
in many other jurisdictions. 245
The Court's holding directly subverts the basis for these sentiments.
Moreover, the holding helps lend credence to the securities statutes
enacted by Congress. Congress enacted SLUSA to stem the shift of
class action from federal to state courts, thus aiming to create a less
complex legal environment and thus prevent class action suits from
frustrating the intentions of the PSLRA. 246 The Supreme Court's de-
cision helps counter the widespread belief that other nations, includ-
ing Great Britain, far more effectively discourage frivolous
241. Id. at 101.
242. See Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct at 1509. "The magnitude of the federal interest in protecting
the integrity and efficient operation of the market for nationally traded securities cannot be
overstated."
243. Id. at 1510, citing Blue Chip Stamps, 412 U.S. at 740.
244. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at 74.
245. Id. at 77.
246. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1511.
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litigation.2 47 In sum, while a quantifiable affect from the decision
might not be available, it is important to recognize that the Supreme
Court has taken a step towards ensuring that New York (and the
United States) retains its position as the financial capital of the
world. 24 8
VI CONCLUSION
Congress' enactment of the PSLRA and SLUSA caused plaintiffs to
become more creative in attempting to circumvent the federal pre-
emption and subsequent dismissal of their class action securities suits
premised on Rule 10b-5. Initially, the Second Circuit allowed these
plaintiffs to escape federal preemption if they tailored their plaintiff
class to those who had merely held, rather than purchased or sold,
their securities. Fortunately, the Supreme Court, recognizing the vex-
atious nature of these holding claims, has now rejected this notion as a
viable securities claim.
As a result, the Court's decision is in harmony with its prior con-
struction of the federal securities statutes. Further, the decision is in
accord with Congress' stated policy justifications for enacting the
PSLRA and SLUSA. The Court's holding also has a beneficial impact
on America's securities exchanges. By reducing the number of merit-
less securities suits in our courts, the perception that our securities
exchanges leave businesses vulnerable to increased litigation costs is
weakened. Consequently, the Court's decision helps reverse the dan-
gerous economic trend of the financial services industry migrating
overseas, thereby preserving America's status as the financial capital
of the world.
247. McKinsey Study, supra note 205, at ii.
248. However, this is not to imply, in any manner, that the Supreme Court should base its
decisions on economic protectionist policies, for that, if at all, would certainly be the role of
Congress.
2007]

